Costly bankruptcy and incomplete markets cause ine¢ cient liquidity hoarding.
Introduction
One of the most interesting phenomena marking the recent …nancial crisis was the "freezing" of the interbank market. As early as the fall of 2007, following the collapse of the market for asset backed commercial paper, European banks reported di¢ culty borrowing in the interbank market. At the same time, interbank borrowing rates reached record levels. Di¢ culty obtaining liquidity in interbank markets was subsequently experienced in many countries. As a result, central bank borrowing facilities became an essential source of liquidity for …nancial institutions.
One possible explanation for the market freeze was the fear of counter-party risk. Because of the widespread exposure to sub-prime mortgage-backed securities, banks had good reason to be wary of lending to any bank that might be a credit risk. A second possible explanation was that banks were hoarding liquidity because they feared the loss of access to the interbank market in the future. There is substantial evidence that banks did in fact build up cash positions (Acharya and Merrouche, 2009; Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen, 2008; Ashcraft, McAndrews and Skeie, 2011) 1 . The two explanations are not unrelated, of course. If access 1 Afonso, Kovner and Schoar (2011) document that while rates spiked and terms became more sensitive to borrower risk, borrowing amounts remained stable in the US Fed Funds market during the Lehman episode.
They argue that it is likely that the market did not expand to meet the additional demand, which is consistent to the interbank market is expected to be di¢ cult-because of fears of counter party risk, for example-liquidity hoarding in the present would be a rational response.
In this paper, we use a simple model of liquidity management to analyze the possibility of liquidity hoarding and its impact on e¢ ciency. We …nd that ine¢ cient hoarding is a robust phenomenon in a laisser-faire equilibrium.
Our model assumes a large number of "bankers," who can hold two types of assets, a liquid asset and an illiquid asset. We refer to the liquid asset as "cash" and refer to the illiquid asset simply as "the asset." Bankers are subject to stochastic liquidity shocks that requires an expenditure of one unit of cash. 2 If a banker lacks the cash to make the required expenditure, he is forced to sell some of his holdings of the (illiquid) asset. If the demand for cash is high, the price of the asset will be correspondingly low. In extreme cases, the price of the asset may be so low (and the cost of liquidity so high) that the banker chooses to default. In that case, the banker is forced into a costly bankruptcy. In equilibrium, bankers weigh the cost of holding cash against the risk of having to sell assets at "…re sale"prices or experiencing a costly bankruptcy.
We begin our analysis by solving the problem of a planner who determines how much cash to hold and when to distribute it. The solution to the planner's problem takes a very simple form: after determining the e¢ cient amount to hold at the …rst date, the planner supplies cash to every banker who needs it at a given date, until the supply runs out. Even though there may be a future need for cash, the planner never carries forward a positive balance as long as there is a banker who needs cash to meet a liquidity demand today.
The simple form of the solution to the planner's problem makes it easy to identify ine¢ cient hoarding. Hoarding liquidity is ine¢ cient if and only if it occurs when there are still bankers who need liquidity. We show that, in a laisser-faire market equilibrium, ine¢ -cient hoarding always occurs with positive probability. More precisely, when the demand for cash is su¢ ciently high, some illiquid bankers will be priced out of the market for cash and with our result on rationing in the interbank market when demand for liquidity is high. 2 For example, the liquidity shock could be interpreted as the random demand for immediate payment of a senior debt claim.
forced into bankruptcy at the same time as some liquid bankers are hoarding cash instead of supplying it to the market.
A liquid banker has two reasons for hoarding cash. One is the precautionary motive. The banker may himself receive a liquidity shock in the future. If he uses his cash today, he can still obtain cash by selling the illiquid asset tomorrow, but the cost of obtaining cash may be very high. Another is the speculative motive. If the future demand for cash is very high, asset prices will be low. If he does not receive a liquidity shock, a hoarder may pro…t in those states by buying assets at …re sale prices. Clearly, these motives are two sides of the same coin: the same cash satis…es both motives.
The precautionary and speculative motives are a function of the expected volatility of future asset prices. Asset-price volatility results from the use of the asset market as a source of liquidity. When liquid bankers …rst supply cash in exchange for assets, they create an imbalance in the system. They are increasing their holdings of illiquid assets and reducing their holding of liquid assets. If these large, illiquid bankers are subsequently hit by a liquidity shock, they have even more assets to dump on the market, producing a greater …re sale and reducing asset prices further. A laisser-faire equilibrium is ine¢ cient because the incentives to hoard are simply too high. The build up in volatility in one period is anticipated in previous periods and increases the precautionary and speculative motives for (ine¢ cient) hoarding.
To verify the role of …re sales in causing ine¢ cient hoarding we consider an alternative model in which the liquidity shock represents the demand for repayment of a non-recourse loan. Because the loan is non-recourse, only the assets that have been pledged as collateral for these loans are liquidated in the event of default. In the alternative economy, the large banks that buy up assets and later default do not create large …re sales. Only their initial holdings of assets are liquidated. We show that, when loans are non-recourse, both the aggregate amount of liquidity and its allocation are e¢ cient. This result provides a rationale for the use of non-recourse, securitized lending. It is a way of preventing or mitigating the …re sales that result from the liquidation of the entire …nancial institution.
Another thought experiment shows an interesting link between hoarding and the level of aggregate liquidity in the economy. We consider an alternative model in which all liquidity shocks arrive in a single period. This means that when considering whether to supply liquidity, a banker knows that he will not receive a future liquidity shock (there is no precautionary motive) and that there will be no future …re sales (no speculative motive). In this case, it is no surprise that there is no (ine¢ cient) hoarding and the market allocates the available liquidity e¢ ciently. But, in addition, the aggregate level of liquidity in the economy is also e¢ cient. By contrast, in the baseline model with hoarding, one ine¢ ciency (hoarding) leads to a second ine¢ ciency (the level of liquidity).
Since laisser-faire is ine¢ cient, there may be scope for intervention by the Central Bank (CB). The CB is subject to more constraints than a central planner, however. A central planner has exclusive control over the allocation of liquidity. The CB, by contrast, has to compete with markets in which cash and assets are exchanged. Generally speaking, when agents can trade in side markets, it is harder to improve welfare while satisfying incentivecompatibility constraints. In this case, however, the CB can successfully implement the planner's solution. Because the central bank is a large player, it changes the prices at which markets clear. The optimal strategy is for the CB to accumulate and supply so much liquidity that private suppliers of liquidity are forced out of the market. More precisely, the CB makes liquidity cheap enough that none of the bankers wants to supply liquidity in competition with the CB. In equilibrium, no one apart from the CB holds cash and every one relies on the Lender of Last Resort (LoLR) for liquidity.
The fundamental reason for the ine¢ ciency of the laisser-faire equilibrium is the incompleteness of markets. Illiquid bankers are forced to acquire cash ex post by selling the asset on the spot market, rather than entering into contingent contracts for the provision of cash ex ante. This might suggest that introducing markets for contingent claims to cash could restore the …rst best, but this is not correct. We show, to the contrary, that such markets cannot improve equilibrium welfare in the presence of asymmetric information. In an extension of our basic ine¢ ciency result, we show that introducing a market for contingent liquidity cannot improve welfare in a laisser-faire equilibrium. More precisely, if bankers cannot be forced to deliver the liquid asset when they have received a liquidity shock or, conversely, cannot be forced to receive the liquid asset when they have not received a liquidity shock, the possibility of arbitrage in spot markets, together with private information about the liquidity shock, rules out any gains from trade. 3 This result provides a justi…cation for the incompleteness of markets assumed in our baseline model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin our analysis in Section 2 by studying the constrained-e¢ cient allocation chosen by a central planner who accumulates a stock of liquid assets and distributes them to the banks that report a need for liquidity. Then,
in Section 3, we analyze a laisser-faire economy in which banks make their own decisions about liquidity accumulation and liquidity provision. In Section 4, we show that the Central Bank, in its role as Lender of Last Resort, can achieve the same allocation as the planner, in spite of the competition from the asset market. We consider some variants of the model to shed more light on the sources of ine¢ ciency in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Related literature
At a general level, our paper is reminiscent of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Gale (1994, 1998) . These papers show that, when potential buyers of assets are themselves …nan-cially constrained, the asset prices may fall below their fundamental value and be determined by the available liquidity in the market, that is, we observe cash-in-the-market prices. 4 Our paper is also related to the literature on portfolio choice and the liquidity of the …nancial system (e.g., Allen and Gale (2004a,b), Gorton and Huang (2004) , Diamond and Rajan (2005) , and Acharya, Shin and Yorulmazer (2011)). Recent work by Diamond and 3 This result has a family resemblence to an observation of Cone (1983) and Jacklin (1987) . They showed that in the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model, banks cannot increase welfare if depositors have access to forward markets. Access to forward markets allows depositors to engage in arbitrage that undermines the bank's ability to provide incentive-compatible liquidity insurance. 4 Also, see Allen and Gale (2005) for a review of the literature that explores the relation between asset-price volatility and …nancial fragility when markets and contracts are incomplete. On the other hand, the success of the CB's policy could be seen as a vindication of the Goodfriend and King view. The fact that the LoLR has to take over the entire market to implement the planner's solution should give us pause, however.
Constrained e¢ ciency
In this section, we characterize the constrained-e¢ cient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem in which the planner accumulates and distributes the liquid asset. The resulting allocation serves as the benchmark for our welfare analysis of laisser-faire equilibrium.
Primitives
Time: Time is divided into four dates, indexed by t = 0; 1; 2; 3. At the …rst date, bankers choose the amount of liquidity they hold as part of their portfolio. At the second and third dates, bankers receive liquidity shocks and trade assets in order to obtain the liquidity they need. At the …nal date, asset returns are realized.
Assets: There are two assets, a liquid asset that we refer to as cash, and an illiquid asset that we will refer to simply as the asset. Cash can be stored from period to period and one unit of cash can be converted into one unit of consumption at any date. The asset can be stored from period to period. One unit of the asset has a return of R > 1 units of cash at date 3. where c 0 denotes consumption at date 0 and c 3 denotes consumption at date 3 and > 1 is a parameter. The interpretation of this utility function is the following: bankers prefer consumption at date 0 to consumption at date 3, so holding cash after date 0 (instead of converting it into consumption immediately) involves an opportunity cost . In equilibrium, the banker has to weigh the cost of foregoing immediate consumption against the bene…ts of holding cash. These bene…ts include the capital gains realized when the future price of cash is high as well as the return to unused cash in the last period.
Liquidity shocks: We model a liquidity shock as a random demand for payment of one unit of cash. Each banker receives a liquidity shock at exactly one of the dates t = 1; 2; 3. The probability of receiving the shock at date 1 is 1 , at date 2 it is (1 1 ) 2 , and at date 3 it is 1
. The aggregate liquidity shocks 1 and 2 are assumed to be independent random variables with cumulative distribution functions F 1 ( 1 ) and F 2 ( 2 ). We assume that 1 and 2 have a common support [0; 1]. The "law of large numbers" convention dictates that the probability of receiving a shock at date t is equal to the fraction of bankers receiving the shock.
Bankruptcy: A banker who is unable to make the required payment is considered to be bankrupt. If a banker becomes bankrupt, we assume that all his assets are immediately liquidated. For simplicity, we assume that the liquidation costs consume the entire value of the assets. This assumption can be relaxed, but it greatly simpli…es the analysis and does not appear to a¤ect the qualitative results too much.
Note 1
In an earlier version of the paper, we modeled the liquidity shock as the demand for repayment of a callable bond. Each banker was assumed to issue a bond with face value equal to one unit of cash to a creditor with Diamond-Dybvig time preferences. That is, the creditor wanted to consume at date 1 with probability 1 , at date 2 with probability (1 1 ) 2 , and at date 3 with probability 1
Thus, the demand for repayment would arrive as a liquidity shock with the same probability as described above. For simplicity, we have eliminated the creditors from the model and instead treat the liquidity shock as a random cost of maintaining the banker's portfolio. This approach is similar to the one used by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) . In the case of Holmstrom and Tirole, however, the amount of cash that must be paid is proportional to the fraction of the portfolio saved. In the present model, by contrast, the liquidity shock is a …xed cost: if it is not paid in full, all the assets disappear. Note 2 Our model has four dates, rather than the three dates that are standard in much of the banking literature. More precisely, there are two dates at which bankers can receive liquidity shocks while they are still illiquid. (At date 3, the banker receives the cash returns from the illiquid asset and can use these to deal with the liquidity shock). Although this seems a small extension, it is crucial for the analysis of liquidity hoarding. When a liquid banker is deciding at date 1 whether to hoard cash or supply it to the market, the possibility that he will be hit by a liquidity shock at the next date provides a precautionary motive for hoarding.
Similarly, the possibility of an even greater …re-sale at date 2 provides a speculative motive for hoarding. We show in Section 5 that in a three-period model, i.e., a model without date 2, ine¢ cient hoarding cannot occur in equilibrium. In fact, the equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient.
The planner' s problem
At date 0, all bankers are identical and risk neutral. Since it is possible to make transfers between bankers at date 3, we can redistribute the total surplus any way we like. So, maximizing ex ante welfare is essentially equivalent to maximizing total expected surplus.
In what follows, we take this as the planner's objective function. In addition to the usual feasibility constraints, the planner operates subject to the constraint that he cannot transfer assets between bankers. If the planner were able to transfer assets in this way, he would assign all assets at date 1 to bankers who had already received a liquidity shock, thus rendering the liquidity shocks at date 2 irrelevant. Or he could transfer all the assets to a small set of bankers of measure " > 0, say, thus reducing the need for liquidity to an arbitrarily small amount. To avoid this trivial outcome, we restrict the planner's actions to accumulating cash at date 0, distributing cash at dates 1 and 2, and redistributing the consumption good at date 3. It is because of this constraint that we refer to the solution of the planner's problem as a constrained-e¢ cient allocation. The planner is assumed to face the same opportunity cost of holding cash, , as the bankers.
Suppose that the planner has m 1 units of cash at the beginning of date 2 and the state is ( 1 ; 2 ). There are (1 1 ) 2 bankers who receive a liquidity shock in this period. The optimal strategy is to supply the lesser of (1 1 ) 2 and m 1 to the bankers in need of cash. Each unit of cash is worth one unit of consumption if held until date 3, but each unit distributed to a banker with a liquidity need saves an asset worth R > 1 at date 3. So it is optimal to save as many bankers as possible from default. Now suppose the planner has m 0 units of cash at the beginning of date 1 and the state is 1 . There are 1 bankers who receive a liquidity shock in this period. Each unit of cash distributed to these bankers is worth R if it saves an asset. On the other hand, the expected value of a marginal unit of cash held until date 2 must be less than R. As we have seen, the value of cash is at most R and it will be only 1 if the amount carried forward is greater than (1 1 ) 2 , which happens with positive probability if the amount carried forward is positive. So it is optimal to save as many bankers as possible from default at date 1, that is, the optimal strategy is to distribute the lesser of m 0 and 1 at date 1.
At date 0, the choice of how much cash to hold is determined by equating the marginal cost of cash, , to the marginal value of cash. As usual, a unit of cash held at the end of date 0 is always worth at least one unit of consumption, but it may be worth R units if it can be used to save an asset. The probability that the marginal unit of cash is used to save an asset is simply the probability that m 0 is less than 1 + (1 1 ) 2 . This probability is calculated to be
so the marginal value of cash carried forward at date 0 is R 1
The solution to the planner's problem is described by an array
where m 0 0 is the amount of cash carried forward from date 0, m 1 ( 1 ) is the amount of cash carried forward from date 1 in state 1 and m 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is the amount of cash carried forward from date 2 in state ( 1 ; 2 ). The previous argument leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The planner's optimal strategy is characterized by an array
de…ned by the following conditions:
and R (R 1)
Proof. See Appendix.
Note 3
We have assumed so far that the planner has complete information about the banker's types. That is, he observes the realizations of 1 and 2 and knows which bankers have received a liquidity shock at each date. In the case where liquidity shocks are private information, the planner needs to use an incentive-compatible mechanism in order to extract information from the bankers.
A direct mechanism is de…ned by an array
is the probability that an agent who reports a liquidity shock at date 1 in state 1 receives one unit of cash, t 1 ( 1 ) is the the amount of cash he pays for it at date 3, 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is the probability that an agent who reports a liquidity shock at date 2 in state ( 1 ; 2 ) receives a unit of cash and t 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is the amount of cash he pays for it at date 3. An agent who reports no liquidity shock is assumed without loss of generality to receive no cash and make no payment. We can show that the constrained-e¢ cient allocation that solves the planner's problem can be implemented as a truth-telling equilibrium of an incentive-compatible direct mechanism.
Proposition 2 The solution to the planner's problem described in Proposition 1 can be implemented by an incentive-compatible direct mechanism when liquidity shocks are private information.
We postpone the proof of this result until Section 4, where it appears as a corollary of another, stronger result.
A laisser-faire economy
In this section, we provide an account of equilibrium in a laisser-faire economy. We begin by describing the activities in each of the dates t = 0; 1; 2; 3. We assume that, at each date, bankers hold either one or zero units of cash in equilibrium.
It turns out that this is optimal: a banker cannot increase his payo¤ by deviating from this strategy at any point and holding a fractional unit of cash. 6 There exist equilibria in which holding a fraction of a unit is optimal, but it greatly simpli…es the analysis to restrict attention to cases where all bankers hold zero or one units of cash.
7
Date 1 At the beginning of date 1, a fraction 1 of bankers receive a liquidity shock. The liquid bankers who receive the shock reduce their cash holdings and end the period with a portfolio consisting of one unit of the asset and no cash. If they fail to make the payment, they lose everything. The illiquid bankers who receive a liquidity shock sell part of their asset holdings in exchange for one unit of cash and end the period with a portfolio consisting 6 Proofs are available from the authors. 7 A more subtle point is that a symmetric equilibrium, in which every banker holds 0 < < 1 units of cash at date 0 and every liquid banker who does not receive a liquidity shock at date 1 holds 0 < < units of cash, does not exist. The problem is that, at date 1, assuming that every other banker chooses to hold units of cash, a banker would be better o¤ by deviating to 0 or 1 units.
of 1 p 1 units of the asset and no cash, where p 1 6 1 denotes the price of one unit of cash. 8 If some of these bankers cannot obtain cash, they must be indi¤erent between obtaining cash and default. This will be the case if p 1 = 1.
An alternative to asset sales is secured borrowing, in which illiquid bankers who receive a shock borrow one unit of cash at the interest rate r 1 = p 1 R 1 and put up p 1 units of the asset as collateral. The loan matures at date 3, at which point the banker either repays 1+r 1 = p 1 R units of cash in principal and interest or forfeits the collateral. This arrangement o¤ers both parties exactly the same returns as the asset sale, so if p 1 is the market-clearing price of cash, r 1 must be the market-clearing interest rate on secured loans.
Illiquid bankers who do not receive a shock do not trade and end the period with their initial portfolio consisting of one unit of the asset and no cash. The liquid bankers who do not receive a liquidity shock have the option of acquiring p 1 units of the asset using their one unit of cash. Liquid bankers who use their cash to purchase the asset become illiquid bankers. There are now two types of illiquid bankers, those who had no cash to start with and end the period with a portfolio (1; 0) and those who purchased assets with cash and end the period with a portfolio (1 + p 1 ; 0). We call the two types small and large illiquid bankers, respectively. The liquid bankers who do not purchase assets at date 1 are called hoarders. We denote by the fraction of the liquid bankers that do not receive a liquidity shock and choose to become large illiquid bankers. The complementary fraction, 1 , become hoarders and end the period with their initial portfolio consisting of one unit of the asset and one unit of cash. 8 Our results do not change if we allow for the forced sale of assets when banks cannot obtain one unit of cash. The prices of one unit of cash at dates 1 and 2 can take arbitrarily high values under this alternative.
We have not reported these results here, but proofs are available from the authors. hold one unit of the asset, are willing to supply the asset for one unit of cash at any price p 2 1 (because the alternative is default). Similarly, the large illiquid bankers, who hold 1 + p 1 units of the asset, are willing to supply the asset for one unit of cash at any price
Again, an alternative to asset sales is that banker's in need of liquidity engage in secured lending at date 2. In order to obtain one unit of cash, the banker pays an interest rate of r 2 = p 2 R 1 and puts up p 2 units of the asset as collateral. At date 3, he is obliged to pay p 2 R units of cash to discharge the debt and reclaim the collateral.
The allocation of assets in the …rst two dates is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 .
- 
Market clearing
In this section, we identify the market-clearing prices p 1 and p 2 , beginning at date 2 and working back to date 1. The price of cash at date 1 (respectively, date 2) will be a function of the state 1 at date 1 (respectively, the state ( 1 ; 2 ) at date 2), but for the most part this notation will be suppressed because we take the state as given in what follows.
Market clearing at date 2
Suppose that the state of the economy at date 2 is ( 1 ; 2 ). As we explained above, the demand for cash comes from the (large and small) illiquid bankers who receive a liquidity shock at date 2. The supply of cash comes from the hoarders who do not receive a liquidity shock at date 2. There are three regimes in the market for cash and assets at date 2, de…ned by two critical values of 2 that are denoted by 2 and 2 and de…ned by 2 = (1 ) (1 ) and 2 = 1 :
(i) Low demand for liquidity 2 < 2 . When the value of 2 is low enough, the amount of cash held by the hoarders is more than enough to supply the illiquid bankers, so at the margin some hoarders have to be willing to hold cash. They are indi¤erent between holding cash and the asset if and only if the price of cash satis…es p 2 = R 1 .
(ii) Intermediate demand for liquidity 2 < 2 < 2 . When the value of 2 is in this intermediate range, the hoarders have enough cash to supply the large illiquid bankers and some, but not all, small illiquid bankers. The small illiquid bankers must be indi¤erent between selling their assets for cash and defaulting, which will be true if and only if p 2 = 1.
(iii) High demand for liquidity 2 > 2 . Finally, when demand for cash is high, the hoarders have enough cash to supply some, but not all, large illiquid bankers, so the large bankers must be indi¤erent between selling assets to obtain cash and defaulting.
This occurs if and only if p 2 = 1 + p 1 .
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following proposition, which is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Proposition 3
The market-clearing price at date 2 is denoted by p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) and de…ned by
where 2 = (1 ) (1 ( 1 )) and 2 = 1 ( 1 ).
- Figure 3 about here-
Market clearing at date 1
The analysis of market clearing at date 1 is a bit more complicated, because bankers'decisions depend on expectations about prices at date 2. The …rst step is to show that, in equilibrium, there will always be some bankers who buy assets and some who hoard cash at date 
.
On the other hand,p ( ) = 1 implies that = . Putting these facts together, we can characterize the equilibrium values of p 1 and in the following result.
Proposition 5
The market clears at date 1 if and only if the equilibrium values of and p 1 are given by
and
for every value of 0 1 1, wherẽ
for every value of 0 1 and is the unique value of 2 (0; 1) satisfyingp ( ) = 1.
Market clearing at date 0
We can show that 0 < < 1 in equilibrium at date 0, so bankers must be indi¤erent between holding cash and spending it. The cost of holding liquidity is . The bene…t of holding liquidity equals the di¤erence between the payo¤ of a liquid banker and the payo¤ of an illiquid banker. 10 We have to consider three cases:
(i) Shock occurs at date 1: In this case, a liquid banker uses his own cash to make the required expenditure and avoids default, whereas an illiquid banker needs to sell a fraction p 1 ( 1 ) of his assets. Hence, a liquid banker's payo¤ is, in expectation,
(ii) Shock occurs at date 2: In this case, a liquid banker can use his own cash to avoid default. However, a (small) illiquid banker needs to sell assets at date 2. For p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) 6 1, the (small) illiquid banker can get the needed liquidity by selling p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) units of assets, but for p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) > 1 he has to default. Hence, a liquid banker's payo¤, in expectation, is (1 1 ) 2 R minf1; p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )g more than an illiquid banker's payo¤.
(iii) Shock occurs at date 3: In this case, a liquid banker can acquire p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) units of the asset at date 2, which results in a liquid banker's payo¤, in expectation, to be
2 ) R more than an illiquid banker's payo¤.
When we combine these three cases and use the equilibrium condition
, we get the following result.
Proposition 6
In equilibrium, 0 < < 1, which implies that bankers will be indi¤erent at date 0 between holding liquidity and not holding it. Bankers are indi¤erent if and only if
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is described by the endogenous variables , ( 1 ), p 1 ( 1 ), and p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )
satisfying the equations (3), (4), (5) and (6) .
A comparison of the equilibrium de…nition, above, with the planner's solution in Proposition 1 makes it clear that there are two major di¤erences between the equilibrium allocation and the planner's solution. First, the equilibrium value of must satisfy the …rst-order condition in equation (6), which di¤ers from the …rst-order condition in equation (2) . Second, it is clear from Proposition 5 that ine¢ cient hoarding occurs in equilibrium, but not in the solution to the planner's problem as described in equation (1) . These di¤erences result from the fact that illiquid bankers are forced to obtain liquidity by selling assets in the spot markets at dates 1 and 2. This trade has a number of general-equilibrium e¤ects. In the …rst place, it gives rise to large banks at date 1. This in turn causes greater asset-price volatility at date 2, when some of these large banks fail. The anticipation of this asset-price volatility provides the incentive to hoard liquidity at date 1. We con…rm this explanation in Section 5, where we consider alternative speci…cations of the model and show that, absent these e¤ects, the laisser-faire equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient.
Note 4
The constrained e¢ cient allocation is de…ned by the planner's problem, which leaves the original allocation of the asset unchanged, except in the case of default where the asset is "consumed"by liquidation costs. In a laisser-faire equilibrium, on the other hand, the allocation is endogenous because assets are traded for cash at dates 1 and 2. So the feasible set of allocations is in some sense larger than the set of feasible allocations for the planner's problem. How can we be sure that the equilibrium allocation generates lower welfare than the planner's problem? The key feature of the laisser-faire equilibrium is that assets are transferred from bankers who already received a liquidity shock to bankers who have not yet received a liquidity shock. This increases the demand for cash and hence increases the default costs, other things being equal. To put it another way, if the assets remained with their original owners and only cash changed hands, the outcome would be unambiguously better. Thus, the equilibrium allocation must be constrained ine¢ cient.
The Lender of Last Resort
In this section, we introduce a Central Bank (CB) into the model. We describe an equilibrium in which the CB acts as the sole supplier of liquidity, all bankers choose to be illiquid (i.e.,
hold no cash at date 0), and the constrained-e¢ cient policy characterized in Proposition 1
can be implemented as part of a competitive equilibrium.
Our approach is constructive. We assume that = 1 and that the CB chooses as its policy the solution to the planner's problem (m 0 ; m 1 ; m 2 ) given in Proposition 1. We de…ne an equilibrium with the CB acting as a Lender of Last Resort along the lines of the laisserfaire equilibrium. We continue to use the language of asset sales, but this is equivalent to supplying cash in the form of secured loans using the asset as collateral, as described in Section 3.
At date 2, there are no large illiquid bankers, so the demand for liquidity comes from the (1 1 ) 2 small illiquid bankers who have received a liquidity shock at date 2. Since the supply of cash is max fm 0 1 ; 0g, the market-clearing price p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) is de…ned by
Similarly, at date 1, the demand for liquidity comes from the 1 illiquid bankers who receive a liquidity shock at date 1 and the supply is at most m 0 . If 1 > m 0 the market-clearing price must be p 1 ( 1 ) = 1, but when 1 < m 0 the price may lie anywhere between E [p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) j 1 ] and 1. Since the CB can control the price, we assume that it sets p 1 (
Then the market-clearing price is
Market clearing at date 0 requires that it is optimal for bankers to choose = 1. We can show that this is the case, which gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 7 There exists an equilibrium in which the CB acts as the sole provider of liquidity; all bankers choose to be illiquid at date 0, that is, = 1; market-clearing prices at dates 1 and 2 are given by equations (8) and (7), respectively; and the constrained-e¢ cient policy (m 0 ; m 1 ; m 2 ) given in Proposition 1 is implemented.
Hence, the CB, by acting as the sole provider of liquidity, can implement the constrainede¢ cient allocation as an equilibrium.
Note 5
We follow most of the banking literature in treating "money" as a consumption good. In particular, when modeling the CB, we assume that it has the same opportunity cost of liquidity as private bankers do: to obtain a unit of cash the CB has to give up > 1 units of "consumption." Our main interest is to identify the sources of market failure. For that purpose, it is appropriate to assume the regulator has access to the same technology as the market, so we ignore the possibility that the CB can supply liquidity more cheaply than the market. Allen, Carletti and Gale (2012) study a model in which the CB can create reserves "costlessly"and derive very di¤erent results from the standard "real"model. Their results are interesting and raise important policy issues that go beyond the scope of the present paper.
Note 6 As a corollary of Proposition 7, we obtain Proposition 2. The equilibrium allocation implemented by the CB de…nes a direct mechanism ( 1 ( 1 ) ; t 1 ( 1 ) ; 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) ; t 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) as follows:
The equilibrium conditions ensure that the mechanism is incentive compatible, so truthtelling is optimal for the bankers.
Sources of ine¢ ciency
So far, we have focused on the ine¢ ciency of laisser-faire equilibrium and the appropriate intervention by the CB that restores e¢ ciency. In this section, we try to identify the essential sources of ine¢ ciency by analyzing variants of the model in which crucial distortions are removed. We also provide a justi…cation for the incompleteness of markets, which is, in some sense, the fundamental cause of market failure.
Hoarding
We begin by considering a model in which there is no role for hoarding. Suppose there are only three dates, indexed by t = 0; 1; 2. As before, bankers choose their portfolios (more precisely, the amount of liquidity in their portfolios) at date 0. At date 1, they observe the liquidity shock 1 and, at date 2, the asset returns are realized. The speci…cation of the rest of the model is the same as before, mutatis mutandis. We solve for equilibrium backwards, beginning with the second period. If a fraction 1 of the bankers hold cash at date 0 and the state is 1 at date 1, a fraction (1 ) 1 of the bankers can supply their own cash needs and a fraction (1 ) (1 1 ) of the bankers have spare cash that they can supply to the market. The measure of illiquid bankers who need cash is 1 and it is clear that the market for cash will clear at a price de…ned by
The allocation of cash at date 1 is e¢ cient, since the number of bankers who can discharge their debts is min f 1 ; 1 g, that is, every banker who receives a liquidity shock gets the cash she needs, unless the number of bankers receiving a shock exceeds the supply of cash.
To show that the equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient, we have to show that the liquidity decision at date 0 is also e¢ cient. To see this, we need to compare the level of cash held in equilibrium with the level chosen by the planner. In equilibrium, bankers must be indi¤erent between being liquid and illiquid at date 0, that is,
where the RHS and the LHS are the payo¤s for a liquid and an illiquid banker, respectively.
This, in turn, yields the equilibrium condition
Using (9) to evaluate E[p 1 ( 1 )], we can rewrite the equilibrium condition,
In the planner's problem, the marginal cost of cash is and the marginal value of cash is 1 if 1 < m 0 and R if 1 > m 0 . So the planner's …rst-order condition is R(1 F 1 (m 0 ))+F 1 (m 0 ) = , or
Comparing (10) and (11), it is clear that m 0 = 1 and so the level of cash held in equilibrium is e¢ cient.
Proposition 8 When the economy only has three dates, there is no (ine¢ cient) hoarding in equilibrium. In fact, the equilibrium allocation is constrained e¢ cient.
The analysis of the simpli…ed model demonstrates that the ine¢ ciency of a laisser-faire equilibrium depends on ine¢ cient hoarding, which can only occur when there are more than three periods. It is interesting to note that both types of ine¢ ciency, the ine¢ cient level of liquidity at date 0 and ine¢ cient hoarding at date 1, disappear when the third period is eliminated. In other words, one distortion leads to another.
Market liquidity and asset-price volatility
When bankers supply cash at date 1, they acquire assets that make their portfolios larger and less liquid. When 2 is high, the default of large illiquid bankers at date 2 creates a …re sale and increases asset-price volatility. The anticipation of this increased asset-price volatility in turn provides the incentive for ine¢ cient hoarding at date 1. We have argued that this mechanism is the crucial distortion in the model of laisser-faire equilibrium. In this section, we show that asset-price volatility is responsible for ine¢ cient hoarding. We do this by considering an alternative model in which default costs consume only the bankers'
original assets and not the assets acquired at date 1.
Consider the model described in Section 3 with the following change. If a large illiquid banker receives a liquidity shock at date 2 and is unable or unwilling to obtain one unit of cash, he defaults and has to liquidate his original unit of the asset, but not the assets he purchased at date 1. As before, liquidation costs consume the entire unit of the asset.
One interpretation is that a liquidity shock takes the form of a demand for repayment of a non-recourse loan for which the initial one unit of the asset was the collateral. That is, the creditor can seize the asset that serves as collateral, but cannot seize any other assets owned by the banker.
Under the new assumption, a large illiquid banker who acquires p 1 ( 1 ) units of the asset in exchange for its one unit of cash at date 1 is guaranteed to have a return of at least
Even if the large banker defaults on his loan, he only loses the unit of the asset originally pledged as security for the loan and retains the rest of his portfolio. Since only one unit of the asset is at risk, the large banker will only be willing to give up one unit of the asset in exchange for one unit of cash. Then the market-clearing price p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) has the distribution
and the expected value of
With probability 2 , large illiquid bankers receive a liquidity shock and have a payo¤
2 )) R; with probability (1 2 ) they do not receive a shock and have a payo¤ (1 + p 1 ( 1 ) ) R. Thus, the large illiquid banker's expected payo¤ at date 1 is
Now consider the hoarders. With probability 2 , the hoarders receive a liquidity shock and have a payo¤ equal to R and with probability (1 2 ) they do not receive a shock and have a payo¤ (1 + p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) R. Thus, the hoarders'payo¤ at date 1 is
It is optimal to buy assets if and only if the large bankers'payo¤ is at least as great as the hoarders', that is,
Similarly, it will be optimal to hoard if and
Suppose that, in equilibrium, there is ine¢ cient hoarding, that is,
In that case, since illiquid bankers hit by the shock are willing to supply one unit of the asset for one unit of cash, the market clears at p 1 ( 1 ) = 1. But in equilibrium we have
We can rule out = 1, when is not too high, and ( 1 ) = 1 means there is no hoarding, which is a contradiction. Hence, when shocks a¤ect only assets pledged as collateral, rather than the entire bank, equilibrium is characterized by no (ine¢ cient)
hoarding.
The intuition for this result is quite clear. Ine¢ cient hoarding at date 1 requires that
However, the maximum number of assets that can be acquired by a hoarder at date 2 (or saved when hit by the shock at date 2) is one and it will be less than one when 2 is small. Hence, liquid bankers prefer to buy the asset at date 1, rather than hoard. We can also show that the amount of cash held in equilibrium is equal to m 0 . Then we have the following result.
Proposition 9
In the economy with non-recourse loans, there is no ine¢ cient hoarding in equilibrium, that is,
and the constrained-e¢ cient amount of cash is held at date 0,
This result demonstrates the essential role of market liquidity in creating the distortions that lead to ine¢ cient hoarding.
Incomplete markets
In this section, we show that opening a forward market for contingent liquidity contracts at date 0 cannot improve upon the allocation provided by the laisser-faire equilibrium with spot markets alone. In particular, we consider a market formed at date 0 in which some bankers enter into a contract to acquire cash and supply it under certain conditions and other bankers simultaneously enter into a contract to accept cash under certain conditions.
The participants in this market are required to report their types at dates 1 and 2, that is, whether or not they received a liquidity shock in that period. In the event that suppliers have not reported a shock, they may be required to supply one unit of cash, if they have not already done so, in exchange for a speci…ed amount of the asset. The recipients of cash similarly report whether or not they have received a liquidity shock at date 1 and date 2. If they report a shock, they may be supplied with one unit of cash, if they have not already received one, in exchange for a speci…ed amount of the asset. We letp 1 ( 1 ) denote the price of cash at date 1 in state 1 and letp 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) denote the price of cash at date 2 in state
(We continue to describe the provision of liquidity as an exchange of the asset for cash, but this is equivalent to secured lending at an appropriate interest rate).
Suppose that f ; ( 1 ) ; p 1 ( 1 ) ; p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )g is a laisser-faire equilibrium, as described in Section 3, and consider the e¤ect of opening a market for liquidity at date 0. Does any banker have an incentive to participate in the market at the equilibrium prices? The market must satisfy an incentive compatibility constraint to ensure that bankers report their types truthfully. At date 1 in state 1 , one unit of cash can be traded for p 1 ( 1 ) units of cash on the spot market. If p 1 ( 1 ) >p 1 ( 1 ), a banker with cash who has not received a liquidity shock is better o¤ reporting a liquidity shock since he could always sell his unit of cash on the spot market for the higher price. Likewise, if p 1 ( 1 ) <p 1 ( 1 ), a banker without cash who has received a liquidity shock would be better o¤ reporting no liquidity shock since he can always buy cash at the lower price. Thus, incentive compatibility at date 1 requireŝ
for every value of 1 . A similar argument implies that
for every value of ( 1 ; 2 ). Since the prices are the same, it is clear that the market mechanism cannot improve on the allocation provided by the spot markets.
Conclusion
In this paper we have outlined a simple model of liquidity provision and characterized the constrained-e¢ cient allocation as the solution to a planner's problem. The salient feature of the constrained-e¢ cient allocation is the absence of ine¢ cient liquidity hoarding: the planner never carries cash balances forward if there are unsatis…ed demands for liquidity.
In a laisser-faire equilibrium, by contrast, ine¢ cient hoarding always occurs with positive probability.
The ine¢ ciency of equilibrium results, among other things, from the incompleteness of markets. Although we take the market structure as exogenously given, we show that, because of asymmetric information, the introduction of incentive-compatible contingent markets for liquidity cannot improve welfare as long as bankers can obtain liquidity by selling assets. This result suggests that an equilibrium in which markets are incomplete is robust to the opening of contingent forward markets, but it does not mean that no intervention can improve on the equilibrium allocation. In fact, a CB, operating as Lender of Last Resort, can achieve the same allocation as the planner, in spite of facing competition from the market for liquidity. If the CB intervenes very aggressively, it can discourage bankers from holding liquidity. Thus, the CB becomes the sole supplier of liquidity. The crucial advantage of the CB is that, because it is a large player, it can change market prices. Bankers operating in a competitive market are, by contrast, price takers.
We have also explored the features of the model that account for the ine¢ ciency of laisserfaire equilibrium. We showed, in particular, that it is necessary to have one more period than the usual model in order for ine¢ cient hoarding to occur. We also showed that …re sales play an important role in providing incentives for ine¢ cient hoarding and that a form of non-recourse debt can avoid these …re sales and restore constrained e¢ ciency. This bene…t of non-recourse debt should be considered alongside recent criticisms of the "safe harbor" Finally, there is the problem of unwinding its position as economic conditions change. Some writers doubt that the Fed will be able to shrink its balance sheet quickly or that the attempt to do so will destabilize the bond markets. These and other concerns should temper any enthusiasm for the possibility of achieving constrained-e¢ cient liquidity provision by having the Fed become the sole provider. Feasibility requires
for every value of ( 1 ; 2 ). The amount of cash distributed at date 1 in state 1 is denoted by x 1 ( 1 ) and de…ned by putting
for every value of 1 . The amount distributed at date 2 in state ( 1 ; 2 ) is denoted by x 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) and de…ned by putting
for every value of ( 1 ; 2 ).
The expected output from the planner's policy in state
The total amount of the asset at date 3 will be equal to the amount of cash distributed to bankers who receive a liquidity shock at dates 1 and 2, that is,
plus the number of bankers who do not receive a liquidity shock at either date, that is,
. The total amount of cash at date 3 is equal to the amount held by the planner, m 2 ( 1 ; 2 ). Multiplying the amounts of cash and the asset by their respective returns and summing them gives the expression in (13) . The total surplus is equal to the expected output minus the cost of obtaining liquidity, that is,
The planner chooses (x 1 ; x 2 ) to maximize the expected value of (14) subject to the constraints in (12) .
We start the analysis at t = 2 and go backwards. Suppose that the planner has m 1 units of cash at the beginning of date 2 and the state is ( 1 ; 2 ). There are (1 1 ) 2 bankers in need of cash and the optimal distribution strategy is to supply
Thus, the value of m 1 units of cash in state
For a …xed value of 1 , the value of m 1 units of cash at the end of date 1 (before 2 has been realized) is
The derivative of V 2 with respect to m 1 is calculated to be
The expression for V 0 2 (m 1 ; 1 ), the marginal value of cash carried forward to date 2, is quite intuitive. One unit of cash that has not been used can be converted into one unit of consumption, but in some cases it has a value of R because it can be used to "save"one unit of the asset that would otherwise be lost in default. This happens if the total supply of cash at date 2, m 1 , is less than the demand (1 1 ) 2 and the probability of this happening is 1 F 2
. So the value of an extra unit of cash is the probability that m 1 is less than (1 1 ) 2 times R plus the probability that m 1 is greater than (1 1 ) 2 times 1. Now consider the planner's problem at date 1. She has m 0 units of cash in state 1 and must choose the amount x 1 to distribute to bankers. Feasibility requires 0 x 1 m 0 and, without loss of generality, we can assume x 1 1 , since there is no point giving cash to a banker who has not received a liquidity shock. Thus, the planner will choose x 1 to maximize
If the constraint (15) is non-binding, the …rst-order condition
Thus, the constraint (15) must bind and this implies that the optimal policy is
Substituting this decision rule into the objective above, we obtain the value function
At the end of date 0, before 1 is realized, the value of m 0 units of cash is given by
The derivative is easily calculated to be
This expression has an intuitive interpretation. One unit of cash that has not been used can be converted into one unit of consumption. In some states, an extra unit of cash is worth R units because it allows the planner to "save" one unit of the asset. This event occurs if and only if m 0 is less than 1 + (1 1 ) 2 . The expression in parentheses is simply the probability that m 0 is less than 1 + (1 1 ) 2 . At date 0, the choice of how much liquidity to hold is determined by equating the marginal cost of cash, , to the marginal value of cash. That is, m 0 will be chosen to satisfy the …rst-order condition
Proof of Proposition 3 The available supply of cash at date 2 is equal to the number of hoarders (a measure (1 ) ( 1 1 ) (1 )), who did not receive a liquidity shock at date 2 (a fraction 1 2 ). Thus, the available supply is
It is optimal to supply no cash if p 2 < R 1 , to supply some cash if p 2 = R 1 and to supply all the cash if p 2 > R 1 .
The demand for cash from large illiquid bankers is at most
and the demand for cash from small illiquid bankers is at most
The large (resp. small) illiquid bankers will demand one unit of cash if p 2 < 1 + p 1 (resp. p 2 < 1) and will demand no cash if p 2 > 1 + p 1 (resp. p 2 > 1).
As explained in the text, there are three regimes, in which the prices are p 2 = R 1 , p 2 = 1 and p 2 = 1 + p 1 , respectively. We can characterize the three di¤erent regimes at date 2 in terms of the critical values of 2 that divide them. Consider …rst the regime in which p 2 = 1 + p 1 , which occurs if the number of hoarders not hit by the liquidity shock is less than the number of large illiquid bankers hit by the shock:
This inequality is equivalent to 2 > 2 , where 2 is implicitly de…ned by the condition that
Next consider the regime in which p 2 = R 1 , which occurs if the number of hoarders not hit by the liquidity shock is greater than the number of small and large illiquid bankers hit by the shock:
This inequality is equivalent to 2 < 2 , where 2 is de…ned by
. The third regime obviously corresponds to 2 < 2 < 2 .
Proof of Proposition 4
The large illiquid bankers end date 1 with 1 + p 1 ( 1 ) units of the asset and no cash; the hoarders end the period with one unit of the asset and one unit of cash.
Consider the large illiquid bankers …rst. With probability 2 an large illiquid banker receives a liquidity shock and has a payo¤ (1 + p 1 ( 1 ) p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) R; with probability 1 2 he does not receive a shock and has a payo¤ (1 + p 1 ( 1 )) R 1. Thus, the large illiquid banker's expected payo¤ at date 1 is
Now consider the hoarders. With probability 2 , a hoarder receives a liquidity shock and has a payo¤ R and, with probability 1 2 , he does not receive a shock and has a payo¤ (1 + p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )) R 1. Thus, the hoarder's payo¤ at date 1 is
It is optimal to become a large illiquid banker if and only if the large illiquid bankers'payo¤ is at least as great as the hoarders, that is,
Similarly, it will be optimal to hoard if and only if
The proof that equilibrium requires 0 < ( 1 ) < 1 is explained in the text.
Proof of Proposition 5 From Proposition 4, we know what
which implies that
Using this equation, we can de…ne a functionp ( ) by putting
for any 2 (0; 1). The functionp ( ) is increasing in and varies from 1 F 2 ( (1 )) (1 R 1 )
to 1 as varies from 0 to 1. Then there exists a unique value such thatp = 1 and p ( ) < 1 if and only if < .
Ifp ( ( 1 )) < 1 then market clearing requires Since the right hand side is increasing in 1 and varies from 0 to 1 as 1 varies from 0 to 1 there is a unique solution to this equation and it satis…es 0 < 1 < 1.
We claim that the equilibrium value of , call it ( 1 ), satis…es and market clearing requires ( 1 ) < . Then p 1 ( 1 ) =p ( ( 1 )) < 1 implies that all illiquid bankers who receive a liquidity shock must obtain liquidity, that is, ; 1 :
Proof of Proposition 6 We …rst calculate the expected utility of a banker who chooses to hold cash at date 0 and chooses to become a hoarder at date 1. With probability 1 he receives a liquidity shock at date 1 and his payo¤ is R. With probability (1 1 ) 2 he receives a liquidity shock date 2 and his payo¤ is again R. And …nally, with probability (1 1 )(1 2 ) he does not receive a liquidity shock until date 3, in which case he can use his spare liquidity to acquire p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) units of the asset at date 2 and his payo¤ is (1 + p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ))R 1. Hence, the expected utility of a liquid banker is
Next we calculate the expected utility of an illiquid banker. With probability (1 1 )(1 2 ) he does not receive a liquidity shock until date 3 and his payo¤ is R 1 + .
With probability 1 , he receives a liquidity shock at date 1, sells a fraction of his asset p 1 ( 1 )
for cash and receives a payo¤ (1 p 1 ( 1 ))R + . With probability (1 1 ) 2 , he receives a liquidity shock at date 2, in which case his payo¤ is max f0; (1 p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) )Rg + . Hence, the expected utility of an illiquid banker can be written as
In equilibrium, liquid and illiquid bankers should have the same expected return. Note that the …rst and the third terms in the expected returns for a liquid and an illiquid banker are common. Hence, in equilibrium, we obtain
which simpli…es to
which can be written as
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
since with probability 1 he receives a liquidity shock at date 1 and gives up p 1 ( 1 ) units of the asset for cash (or defaults in the case p 1 ( 1 ) = 1), with probability (1 1 ) 2 he receives a liquidity shock at date 2 and gives up p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) units of the asset for cash (or defaults in the case p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) = 1), and with probability (1 1 ) (1 2 ) he does not receive a liquidity shock until date 3 and retains one unit of the asset. By comparison, if he decides to become using the identity (1 1 )(1 2 ) = 1 ( 1 + (1 1 ) 2 )). Similarly, we calculate the payo¤ of an illiquid banker at date 0 as in the proof of Proposition 6 to obtain
using the facts that min fp 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) ; 1g = p 2 ( 1 ; 2 ) and p 1 ( 1 ) = E [p 2 ( 1 ; 2 )].
Equating the payo¤s and eliminating common terms, we obtain
Now it is easy to see that 
